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INTRODUCTION
The vulnerability of supply chains to
antagonistic threats, and more specifically their
distribution networks, has become a major
concern for managers (Spekman and Davis,
2004; Hintsa, 2011).  This concern is supported
by available statistics stating that industries are
losing significant amounts of money and brand
image due to theft, counterfeiting and pilferage
of goods stored at terminals or in transport.  For
instance, statistics recently released by the
European Union (EU) Parliament indicate that
stolen lorries and goods in the EU add up to
some E8.2 billion per year (European
Parliament, 2007).  In the United States (U.S.)
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has
reported cargo theft in the range of $10-30
billion per year (Anderson, 2007).
Counterfeiting is also a major concern for
industries costing approximately $176 billion
per year (Rodwell, et al., 2007).
The insecurity of supply chains is also of
concern to governments.  Recent terror events
around the world (New York 2001, Madrid 2004
and London 2005) have increased the fear that:
1) products moved in supply chains could be
contaminated or substituted with life-hazardous
ones, 2) distribution chains could be used to
smuggle nuclear weapons or terrorists, and 3)
vehicles transporting dangerous goods or
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explore the vulnerability of physical distribution networks to antago-
nistic threats.  Previous research identifies globalization and Just in Time (JIT) as the main causes of
vulnerability.  However, cargo crime has always existed, even before the identification of these
trends.  In this explorative study new factors are brought to light.  In particular, it appears that stake-
holders’ dynamics are influencing the level of security.
weapons for mass destruction could be used as a
weapon against sensitive targets (Rice and
Spayd, 2005).  As a consequence, governments
are actively working to secure their borders and
inland transportation systems by setting policies
and standards that ultimately demand supply
chain companies operate under heightened
security (Sheffi, 2001).
Previous research points out the importance of
risk management approaches to deal with supply
chain security (Giunipero and Eltantawy, 2004;
Spekman and Davis, 2004). Spekman and Davis
(2004) identify six categories of supply chain
related risks and illustrate how to classify them.
Giunipero and Eltantawy (2004) emphasize the
importance of risk management approaches to
evaluate end-to-end technology solutions.  Some
authors have developed supply chain security
frameworks and illustrated future research needs
(Autry and Bobbitt, 2008; Williams et al., 2008).
Autry and Bobbitt (2008) have developed a
framework to address how companies approach
the mitigation of supply chain security by means
of supply chain risk management.  Williams et
al. (2008) performed a literature review to
categorize Supply Chain Security (SCS) factors
and to identify a research agenda focusing on
intra-organizational activities and quantitative
approaches, making explicit the linkage between
security and efficiency.
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Few researchers have undertaken exploratory
studies to discover which stakeholders determine
the vulnerability of distribution networks to
antagonistic threats.  Some authors point out
globalization and JIT as the main causes of the
increased vulnerability (Crone, 2006; Khemani,
2007).  Yet security problems in supply chain
operations were known to exist for many years
before the adoption of globalization and JIT
principles.  Other authors emphasize the
importance of top management commitment,
strategic priority, governmental regulation,
security partnerships and willingness to pay as
facilitators/inhibitors of security (Autry and
Bobbitt, 2008; Voss et al., 2009b).  However,
none of the known authors has attempted to map
a framework that shows which stakeholders
affect the security of physical distribution
networks.  Hence, the suggestion for an
additional hypothesis about other reasons that
may actually be significant factors  affecting the
insecurity of physical distribution networks.
The purpose of this study is to perform an
explorative inquiry to understand which
stakeholders are influencing the security of
physical distribution chains and most
importantly how.  By means of observations and
semi-structured interviews, a framework for
security in physical distribution networks is
outlined and the interaction phenomena and
dynamics among actors are determined.  Finally,
this paper discusses management implications
and outlines the importance of further research
on the physical distribution security topic.
METHODOLOGY
A qualitative methodology is used in this
investigation.  This method has been chosen
because of the explorative nature of this study
and also due to the novelty of the research topic
in the transportation management literature, and
the consequent lack of research constructs
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Autry and Bobbitt,
2008).  The methodology consisted of three main
phases relating to an approach to the literature
review, a data collection plan, and methods of
data analysis.
Approach to Literature Review
 A literature search was performed within
available academic journals to investigate
previous security research in the fields of supply
chain management, and transportation and
logistics management.  Keywords used for the
search were “transportation security,” “supply
chain security,” “physical distribution security,”
and “logistics security.”  Other secondary data
from the internet as well as from trade
magazines were incorporated into the empirical
data collection.  A preliminary system
framework was developed based on the findings
in the academic literature.  Four main
stakeholders, within and outside the supply
chain, were identified: supply chain operators
(including goods owners, transport and logistics
providers), security solutions providers,
criminals, and governments.
Data Collection Plan
Non-participant observations were made during
a workshop and a seminar organized in Sweden
and allowed for a better understanding of how
the security problem is perceived by Swedish
actors.  The workshop was attended by 67
individuals that were divided into groups and
encouraged to discuss the factors influencing the
insecurity of distribution networks.  The seminar
was attended by 42 managers.  It was soon
apparent that the security system was more
complicated than the one hypothesized after the
literature review.  As a consequence, further
actors were added to the framework:  including
law enforcement agencies, insurance companies,
voluntary security certification bodies, and
contract legislation bodies.
Thereafter, to enhance the comprehension of the
roles of these actors in the Physical Distribution
Security System (PDSS) and their reciprocal
interactions, a total of 16 interviews were
conducted, four unstructured and 12 semi-
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structured.  The respondents to be interviewed
were chosen from a convenience sample of
individuals joining a Scandinavian research
project dealing with transportation security.
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics
of the sample interviewed.
The interviews were completely unstructured in
the beginning of the research to gain a better
understanding of key topics and add the widest
range of possible information.  These interviews
were meant to let the respondents freely discuss
the main causes of the vulnerability of physical
distribution networks to antagonistic threats.
Once these topics became more defined, semi-
structured interviews with more pointed
questions were used.  The scheme used for the
semi-structured interviews is provided in
Appendix A.  After eight interviews it was clear
that the factors highlighted by the respondents
corresponded with those identified during the
observation sessions.  Hence, four more
interviews were carried out to ensure saturation
of the data before discontinuing data collection
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Easterby-Smith et al.,
1991).
TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
Industry Position
Respondent 1 Electronics Manufacturer Security manager
Respondent 2 Transportation Lawyer
Respondent 3 Road Carrier Security Manager
Respondent 4 Logistics Service Provider Global Security Manager
Respondent 5 Food Products Security Manager
Respondent 6 Pharmaceutical Security Manager
Respondent 7 Cash Transportation Security Manager
Respondent 8 Law Enforcement Agency Police inspector
Respondent 9 Security Certification International Sales Manager
Respondent 10 Logistics Service Providers Regional Security Manager
Respondent 11 Security Solution Provider Commercial Director
Respondent 12 Road Carrier CEO
Respondent 13 Security Solution Provider CEO
Respondent 14 Shipping company Senior Director
Respondent 15 Shipping Company Corporate Security Manager
Respondent 16 Insurance Company Claims Manager
Methods of Data Analysis
Using content analysis, themes and constructs
were derived from the interviews and merged
with those found in the literature search.  To
enhance validity of the findings, the following
quality criteria were considered during the data
collection and analysis: credibility,
dependability, transferability and confirmability
(Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lambert et al. 2004;
Autry and Bobbitt, 2008).  Credibility concerns
how the personal constructs of the respondents
match the researchers’ perceptions.  The
observations made at the workshop were
compared with the results obtained by a
consulting firm that was responsible for
documenting the workshop.  In addition, since
recording of interviews was not allowed, the
answers provided during the interviews were
verbally repeated to the respondents to confirm
the interpretation provided by the researcher.
Dependability refers to the temporal stability of
the data.  The data collection was initiated with
unstructured interviews and improved with the
development of a semi-structured questionnaire.
To enhance the stability of the data, only the
Journal of Transportation Management64
responses from the semi-structured interviews
were used in the analysis. Transferability is the
ability to apply the results to other contexts.  The
interviews were performed with managers
belonging to a wide set of organizations within
and outside Sweden.  Likewise, the seminar and
workshop where observations were performed
included representatives from diverse logistics
companies in Sweden.  Finally, confirmability is
the extent to which the findings reflect the data
collected.  This was ensured by keeping notes of
the data collected at the observations and during
the interviews.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature scanned in peer-reviewed
logistics, transportation and supply chain
management journals and conference
proceedings is reported in this section by
highlighting the main stakeholders that influence
the security of distribution networks: 1) supply
chain, logistics and transport operators, 2)
security solutions providers, 3) criminals, and 4)
governments.
Supply Chain, Logistics and Transport
Operators
The influence of supply chain, logistics and
transport operators is identified by previous
research exploring the following factors:
globalization and JIT trends, security
partnerships, risk sharing among transport
purchasers and sellers, and willingness to pay.
Globalization and JIT trends are exposing supply
chains to higher risks.  Moving products within
and to foreign countries where companies lack
knowledge of local culture, authorities and
legislation makes it difficult to protect cargo
(Crone 2006; Khemani 2007; Sheffi, 2001).
Crone (2006) compares today’s globalization
strategies to the classic story of the Trojan War
where the Trojans “failed to see the risks of what
appeared to be a benefit.”  Just in Time (JIT)
trends tighten supply chains in a way that
increases the consequences of disruptions and
thereby increasing the risks of security incidents
in distribution networks (Khemani, 2007).
According to an analysis performed by Wilson
(2005), JIT manufacturing and deliveries, and
streamlined order fulfilment techniques, can
reduce in-transit and on-hold inventories but can
also severely increase the magnitude of
disruptions.
In Autry and Bobbitt (2008) as well as in Voss et
al. (2009b) the importance of security related
partnerships covering contractual agreements
and risk and reward sharing among actors is
emphasized.  The authors maintain that
encouraging collaboration among supply chain
members and specifying security requirements in
contractual agreements may improve the security
of distribution chain assets and operations.  In
addition, risk sharing and rewards are also
fundamental practices to stimulate stakeholders
into taking their share of responsibility and
working actively with security.
Only one article explored an issue concerning
owners’ willingness to pay for goods as an
inhibitor of physical distribution security (Voss
et al., 2009a).  According to the authors supply
chain firms are not always willing to pay for
firms offering advanced security transportation.
By means of a survey sent to manufacturing
industries in the food sector, the authors
demonstrate the positive relationship between
concern over security incidents and preferences
for advanced security as well as willingness to
trade off price for advanced security.  The
findings show that price, and delivery reliability,
is more important than security when contracting
suppliers.  Hence, security is not a top priority
when selecting distribution carriers.
Security Solutions Providers
The importance and the fundamental role of
security solution providers to the insecurity of
physical distribution are emphasized by several
authors.  Downey (2004) encourages industry
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leaders to identify research and technology
resources that can minimize the threats along
distribution chains.  According to the author,
technology can fight the “asymmetrical threat
posed by terrorists,” which consists of enemies
seeking supply chains’ weak points instead of
trying “to overcome them by using superior
force.” Sheffi et al. (2003) propose technological
solutions for preventive and recovery operations
to be implemented in three areas: physical
security, information security and freight
security.  Autry and Bobbitt (2008) point out the
importance of security-dedicated communication
and technology, i.e. the implementation of GPS
monitoring, RFID and similar technologies to
monitor and enhance security in supply chains.
Another issue found in previous research is the
impact of security solutions on the efficiency of
supply chains.  Some authors believe that the
introduction of security in physical distribution
may bring higher efficiency, but others don’t.
Sheffi (2001) states that security enhancement
can also bring “collateral benefits” such as trade
facilitation, asset visibility and tracking, faster
standard development, etc.  Other authors assert
that in some cases security measures conflict
with the concepts of lean logistics.  According to
Powanga (2006), basic logistics performance
indicators can be expressed as revenues (order
fulfilment), operating costs (in transit inventory,
transportation, insurance premiums, buffer stock
carrying costs), fixed costs (facilities, capital
utilization) and working capital (buffer stock
levels).  Likewise, Mazeradi and Ekwall (2009)
show, by means of a survey, how the
implementation of the ISPS-code may increase
paperwork and slow down processes in port
terminals.
Criminals
The behaviour of criminal groups targeting
physical distribution is also a factor that may
discourage the enhancement of security.  Ekwall
(2009) affirms that diverse typologies of crime
may be related to attacks against physical
distribution: situational crime, professional
crime and crime displacement effects.
Situational crime is determined by a rational
choice made by weighing diverse factors such as
effort, potential payoff, risk of apprehension and
punishment, and individual needs.  A variation
of situational crime is the professional theft that
is based on methodical plans and takes
advantage of high-tech methods to defeat
protection measures (Ekwall, 2009; Ekwall and
Lumsden, 2007).  Ekwall (2009), according to
the principles of the routine activity theory,
identifies three elements characterizing cargo
theft: a perpetrator, a supply chain (the criminals’
target) and the lack of protective measures.
Insufficient protection in one of the links of a
distribution chain will determine a weak point
and the consequent attack (crime displacement
effect).  Hence, the low protection of distribution
chains makes them attractive to criminals.  At
the same time, the opportunistic behaviour of
criminals may discourage operators from
protecting their assets.
Governments
Governments are mainly afraid of the terror
threats hidden in the vulnerability of supply
chains.  These hidden threats include the
smuggling of weapons or terrorists,
contamination or counterfeiting of products and
usage of transport conveyances as weapons.
Therefore diverse initiatives have been started
by governments around the world to prevent
catastrophic consequences for society.  See
Figure 1:
The first security enhancements were
implemented in the air sector a few months after
the attacks in New York.  The sea sector
followed almost immediately when a standard
framework for the identification and assessment
of vulnerabilities in sea transportation and port
facilities was included in the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)
(Katarelos and Alexopoulos, 2007; Bichou, 2004).
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The involvement of governments is mentioned in
Sheffi (2001) as well as in Sheffi et al. (2003).
According to these authors, the upcoming
security regulations for C-TPAT (Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism), the AEO
(Authorized Economic Operator)  and the ISPS
code could force many distribution firms to
enhance their security levels.
DATA ANALYSIS
In this section the findings from the literature
review are combined with the empirical data
collected from observations and interviews.
Combining the literature review and the
observations, some of the following stakeholders
emerged as key players in security.   The first
section which follows deals with findings from
the observations specifically. The second section
deals with findings that came directly from
interviews of the actors.
Observations
The observations were carried out on the
occasion of two events.  First, a workshop
organized by a Swedish Law Enforcement
Agency.  And secondly, at a seminar organized
by one of the main Scandinavian insurance
companies.  During these events, issues related
FIGURE 1
THREATS TO SOCIETAL SAFETY
to the increasing attacks against distribution
networks were discussed and possible solutions
were elaborated on.  Following are some of the
findings that emerged by organizational type.
These organizations include several new ones
that were brought to light during the workshops
and these include law enforcement agencies,
voluntary certification organizations, insurance
companies, and contract legislation bodies.
Supply Chain, Logistics and Transport Operators
The central role of supply chain, logistics and
transport operators is confirmed by the high
attendance of representatives at the workshops.
However, only the construct related to the
“willingness to pay for security” of transport
buyers was discussed.  The rest of the constructs
generated during the literature review were not
directly mentioned in the workshops.
Security Solutions Providers
During the workshops the importance of security
solutions to protect cargo during transit was
highlighted by the participants; however no
detailed discussion was undertaken on the topic.
On the contrary, secondary data present
extensive discussions on this issue.  Most of the
literature found concerned the “collateral
Spring/Summer 2012 67
benefits” brought by security investments such as
trade facilitation, asset visibility and tracking,
faster standard development, etc. (Rice and
Spayd, 2005).  The same concept of “collateral
benefits” is discussed by Peleg-Gillai et al.
(2006) and Closs and McGarrell (2004).  Willys
and Ortiz (2004) emphasize that efficiency and
security in supply chain transportation are
closely interrelated.  Since higher security may
reduce customs delays so may the higher
transparency of information of goods flows
reduce shipping costs and time.  The same
literature acknowledges the difficulty in reliably
evaluating security investments.  According to
Rice and Spayd (2005) return on investments are
difficult to estimate because of the complexities
in evaluating how well a security solution can
prevent a problem from occurring, how
frequently this would happen, and how cost
savings will be determined.
Government Authorities
The role of governments is mentioned by many
authors in previous literature (Closs and
McGarrell, 2004; Abbott et al., 2003; Sheffi et
al., 2003; Rice and Spayd, 2005; Willys and
Ortiz, 2004).  All the authors are convinced that
authority regulations may disrupt transportation
flows due to Customs’ delays; even though
security will be enhanced.  In addition, some
authors also point out that the absence of
business cases, solid ROIs and clear guidelines
from governments, is frightening many operators
and may result in declining interest towards the
enhancement of distribution security (Lee, 2004;
Rice and Spayd, 2005).  However, the role of
governments was not mentioned in any of the
workshops.
Law Enforcement Agencies
The role of law enforcement agencies in
preventing attacks,  as well as in supporting
operators  efforts in recovering their shipments,
was mentioned  in both  workshops. During the
events, representatives from law enforcement
organizations encouraged transportation
companies to report cargo theft and improve
collaboration with law enforcement.  Law
enforcement agencies were also criticized by the
participants since they don’t often prioritize
cargo theft among their activities nor do they
properly prosecute cargo criminals.  The issue
concerning the low prosecution of criminals has
also been found in articles published in trade
journals (Badolato, 2000; Anderson, 2007).
Voluntary Certification Organizations
Many participants to the workshop mentioned
the existence of TAPA EMEA (Transported
Asset Protection Association)   - an organization
supporting transportation buyers and sellers with
recommendations and guidelines to secure
transportation assets (TAPA EMEA, 2008).
Participants believed that the implementation of
routines and specific technologies suggested by
the organization may enhance physical
distribution security.  Other secondary data
mention the International Standards
Organization (ISO) certification as a means to
enhance supply chain security.  The ISO
proposes best practices and minimum
requirements for supply chain management,
recommends technologies (i.e. mechanical locks
or electronic seals), and establishes
communication standards for radio frequency
based security solutions (Liard, 2007; ISO,
2008).
Insurance Companies
The role of insurers concerns the coverage of the
risks related to loss or damage of the goods
during a transportation assignment.  All the
mentioned parties involved in goods
transportation, including consignors and
consignees, LSPs and transport carriers, have the
opportunity to buy property or liability
insurance, according to what is stated in the
contract.  Likewise, stakeholders have the option
of retaining part of these risks so as to pay lower
premiums.
Journal of Transportation Management68
The role of the insurance companies is
confirmed in both the events where observations
were performed.  The data collected actually
indicate that many operators blame insurance
companies for increased security problems.
Managers were expecting not only financial
solutions but also practical support in choosing
security measures and defining security levels in
transport operations.  Another finding from the
workshops is that if security requirements are
not specified in contracts, operators with a risk-
seeking attitude can trade off the costs for
insurance premiums and excesses with the costs
of implementing security solutions.
Other secondary data used for the analysis and
related to insurance companies concern mostly
the procedures to sub-contract carriers, transfer
risks as well as current regulations to define
cargo liabilities (Stöth, 2004; ICC, 2008; NSAB,
2000).
Contract Legislation Bodies
Participation in the workshops also unveiled the
importance of contract legislation in the
definition of security requirements in
distribution operations.  According to secondary
FIGURE 2
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
(Adapted from STÖTH, 2004, pp. 22)
literature, the relationships among actors
involved in a shipment are regulated by specific
laws.  While transportation disputes are stated in
international conventions and rules (i.e. CIM,
CMR conventions), logistics matters concerning
such operations as inventory management,
labelling or packaging are not put under any
convention and are primarily determined by
industrial organizations or private agreements
(i.e. Incoterms 2000 and NSAB 2000).  As has
already been mentioned, different agreements
have to be executed to move the goods from the
consignor to the consignee.  See Figure 2 below.
These can be performed in verbal or written
form (Stöth, 2004).
Existing regulations like Incoterms or NSAB
2000 focus on the transfer of risks among actors
and indicate Combiterms as a means to split
costs among players.  In addition, in case of loss
these agreements oblige the reimbursement of
the goods invoice value plus 10% for indirect
costs (ICC, 2008; NSAB, 2000).  In these
agreements, nothing is specified about security
requirements for transportation assignments and
how related costs should be split among actors.
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The findings from the observations also reveal
that it is crucial to specify security requirements
in the contracts between transport buyers and
sellers.  However, the legislation bodies, today,
don’t provide any support for this and operators
perceive this process as complicated and
resource and time demanding.  As a
consequence, often verbal agreements are
preferred by companies.
Interviews of Organizations
The interviews highlighted the following
stakeholders as influencing the security of
physical distribution networks: 1) law
enforcement agencies, 2) supply chain,
logistics and transport operators, 3)
criminals, 4) contract legislation bodies and
5) other authorities.
Law Enforcement Agencies
The interviews confirmed the relevance of law
enforcement agencies in the discussion
concerning physical distribution security.
According to three of the respondents, the
problem faced today is that the amount of theft
claims received from transport operators is not
high enough to justify an increase of resources to
combat criminals.  At the same time, transport
operators are afraid to show their brands in theft
statistics.  In addition, they feel that this is only
an administrative cost that will rarely lead to
cargo recovery.
“Transport operators are afraid to show their
brand names in theft statistics and therefore
they don’t announce the problem to the police
that in its turn doesn’t have the real picture of
the situation”.
“Operators are not claiming enough, thus we
cannot allocate resources adequately.”
“Our company has a good cooperation with the
national law enforcement agency.  However we
know that many thefts are not reported by
other companies.  This makes it hard to combat
cargo theft.”
Two respondents also said that to reduce the
increase in cargo theft experienced during recent
years, Swedish law enforcement agencies must
develop programs to increase awareness about
the cargo security problem.
“The activities organized by the law
enforcement agency have contributed to
increase awareness of the cargo theft problem”
“Thanks to the workshops we have had the
possibility to come closer to the law
enforcement agency and strengthen
collaboration”
Finally another problem mentioned in the
interviews was that existing laws to prosecute
criminals are not strong enough to discourage
thieves from taking chances in assaulting cargo
moving in distribution networks.  As a
consequence, it is not only difficult to capture
thieves but also to keep them in custody.
 “Criminals attack according to a trade-off
between risks and revenues.  The situation
today is that supply chains are easy and
profitable targets.  At the same time
prosecution is not severe enough to discourage
perpetrators.”
“Once criminals are captured, we can keep
them in custody for a limited amount of time.
So they are back in business after only few
months.”
“Prosecution should be more severe to
discourage criminals attacking our supply
chains.”
Supply Chain, Logistics and Transport Operators
The role of supply chain actors, including
logistics and transport providers, is also outlined
in the interviews.  The complexity necessary to
develop and formalize agreements among all the
actors, especially with the physical carriers
(road, rail, sea, and air carriers), or between
them (a carrier contracting another carrier) is
also discussed in the interviews. Transportation
carriers are companies owning fleets of vehicles
including vessels, airplanes, trucks, and in some
cases even trains (companies are usually state
owned). Often, within the road sector, the
transport carrier can even be the driver and his
vehicle. Therefore the complexity and
administrative burden experienced, concerning
laws, regulations and standard contracts, makes
informal verbal agreements more congenial.
Journal of Transportation Management70
“It happens that some carriers mention and
stress the complexity of the contracts or
standard agreements.  Large industries or LSPs
can handle them but often small-medium
transport carriers can prefer verbal
agreements”
 “According to our experience the standard
agreements are perceived as too complex and it
has happened that carriers prefer verbal
agreements”
 “We know that in some cases carriers are
engaged with verbal agreements”
“As an insurance association we have had cases
in which transportation carriers had been
engaged with verbal agreements”
Four managers mentioned the difficulties
encountered in raising their prices to enhance
security.  In two of the interviews, the
respondents highlighted the fact that goods
owners requesting higher security must be
willing to pay for it.
“Security costs have to be internalized into our
freight rates. Thus it is difficult for us to remain
competitive on the marketplace”
“Some customers are willing to pay for extra
costs related to security.  Thus we increase our
prices.  In some cases we also perform a
negotiation process with the transport carriers
to define how security costs, direct and indirect,
have to be split”
The interviews also bring to light the influence
of insurance companies.  According to one of the
interviewed professionals, some Scandinavian
insurers appear to exert pressure on their
customers, denying premium discounts to those
retaining risks by purchasing or implementing
security measures.
“We have a dialogue with only one insurance
company and they are not willing to give us
premium reductions.  This is nonsensical...”
 Two respondents declared that insurances’
“excesses” are too high and therefore operators
prefer to pay the consequences of a loss
themselves instead of investing in security.
“We know that if the loss is lower than the
insurance excesses than we prefer to pay it
ourselves”
“We have insurances and also our transport
carriers do.  However we know that companies
prefer to pay the losses themselves, since the
excesses are too high.”
Finally when it comes to application of premium
discounts, opinions diverge.  Two respondents
state that they encounter difficulties in agreeing
on discounts.  Conversely, three respondents
declared that it is possible to have discounts,
although in some cases these are too low and
affect only the excesses.
Security Solutions Providers
All the interviewed managers agree on the
central role of security solutions in the protection
of distribution chains.  Best practices and
technical systems may strongly decrease cargo
attacks.  Three of the interviewed professionals
underlined the importance of using security
solutions to combat criminals attacking
distribution chains.
“We work intensively with detection sensors to
be installed at our facilities and protect them
against various threats.  These sensors include
motion detection or perimeter alarms to be
installed at main doors or windows.”
“We put a great emphasis on security
technologies, and when it comes to the
protection of our facilities we want to be a step
ahead our competitors”
“Our terminals are highly secured although it is
often difficult to have the security budget
approved by top management”
Three respondents stated that some security
solutions are too expensive.
“We make assessments of technologies ‘on
offer.’ However most of these systems cannot
guarantee 100% security and cost too much
money.  You can imagine the financial
implications to implement these systems on a
fleet of a hundred vessels”
“As a security manager I get a limited budget to
spend on security.  Thus it is difficult to buy
more advanced technologies”
“… only those companies that have access to




The perception of the criminals’
opportunistic behaviour is also emphasized
in previous research.  Insufficient protection
in one of the links of a supply chain will
determine a weak point and the consequent
attack (crime displacement effect).  Four
respondents confirmed this line of reasoning:
“Criminals search for weak points and attack in
specific places where they know trucks stop.”
“Criminals attack according to a trade-off
between risks and revenues.  The situation
today is that supply chains are easy and
profitable targets.”
“Security solutions may become ineffective
after a while.  Criminals learn quickly how to
deceive the installed equipment”
“It is very important to set up the best practices
very quick.  However the situation is very
dynamic.  This means that if somebody is
implementing some practice or measure to
avoid attacks than also the criminals will
modify their behaviours to overcome the
resolutions.”
It can be argued that the increased threats and
attacks against distribution networks should
stimulate companies to increase their security
levels: first of all to stop the losses due to theft,
and secondly to comply with upcoming
mandatory requirements meant to stop terrorists.
However, as one respondent commented, this is
not happening:
 “Statistics show increasing attacks against
freight transportation. Nevertheless, for
reasons I can’t understand, operators don’t
consider this as a problem and are not seeking
adequate protection”.
Contract Legislation Bodies
The role of contract legislation is also mentioned
in the interviews.  All the respondents agree that
the specification of security requirements in
contracts may enhance security even though it
requires both a deep understanding of physical
security and achieving an agreement among
parties.  Only one respondent mentions that
contract agreements may be useless, since it is
difficult to verify if a carrier is truly following
the security measures specified in the contract.
As this manager commented, “we request our
carriers to install specific security measures, but
we don’t really know if they follow them or
not.”
Authority
Many of the interviewed respondents have
knowledge of the authority regulations.  Seven
managers mentioned that they know the AEO,
ISPS or C-TPAT initiatives, but only two of them
declared that the AEO initiative can influence
their security investments.
“We are participating to the AEO initiative set
up by the European Commission and are
working to gain compliance.”
“Yes, we are working to meet the AEO
requirements since it is our desire to secure our
operations.  In addition, it is important to gain
compliance to simplify customs inspections and
avoid transport delays.”
                       CONCLUSION
The findings from this explorative study show
diverse factors that may be responsible for the
vulnerability of supply chains and more
specifically of their physical distribution
systems.  Previous research identifies
globalization and JIT as the main causes.
However, by combining these findings with data
collected from secondary sources, observations,
and a total of 16 interviews (4 unstructured and
12 semi-structured) performed with key actors in
the transport security area, the identification of
eight players and their interactions into an
integrated Physical Distribution Security System
can be outlined.  This constitutes an environment
in which other stakeholders and reasons are
brought to light as significant factors.
The Physical Distribution Security System is
illustrated in Figure 3 below, where each actor is
depicted with a Roman Numeral and arrows
show the interdependency among the actors and
the physical distribution security.  Summing up,
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the initiatives organized by the first actor (Actor
I in the figure), the law enforcement agency, may
positively stimulate the development and
implementation of cooperative solutions to
increase security.  However, the behaviours of
some distribution operators that don’t announce
the theft assaults make it difficult for the agency
to allocate enough resources to combat cargo
crime.  At the same time, existing criminal laws
are not able to properly prosecute cargo crime,
which may discourage some companies to
denounce cargo crime.  The second actor (Actor
II, supply chain, logistics and transport
operators) experiences difficulties in defining
security partnerships.  Existing standard
legislative commitments are too complex and at
the same time don’t support the definition of
security requirements. This study confirms that
the willingness to pay for secured freight
transportation is still too low and the low
marginal revenues that are typical of the
transportation market make it difficult to afford
security investments.
The certification organizations (Actor III, i.e.
TAPA EMEA or ISO28000) represent an
incentive for distributors to raise their security
level and gain access to a network of secure
operators.  In addition, standards,
recommendations, and best practices can support
shippers and transport operators in securing their
assets and operations.  The insurance companies,
(Actor IV), seem to have both a negative and
positive effect on the security of physical
distribution.  The negative impact is that it may
happen that risk-seeking companies may trade-
off insurance premiums and excesses with the
implementation of security solutions.
Nevertheless, insurance companies may
stimulate the enhancement of security by
offering premium discounts to distribution
operators.
The providers of security solutions are also
encountering difficulties (Actor V).  While the
development of security technologies and
services offer the possibility to automate or
outsource the processes for enhancing security in
a cost effective manner, companies perceive
costs as too high.  At the same time, absence of
business cases and operational standards results
in   most security solutions being viewed as not
mature enough to be fully implemented in
physical distribution.  The behaviour of
FIGURE 3
THE PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION SECURITY SYSTEM (PDSS)
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criminals may also discourage the enhancement
of security (Actor VI). As long as there are weak
links or nodes in a distribution chain, attacks
will not decrease but will only move from the
protected spots.  Contract legislation bodies
(Actor VII) are today used to define transport
assignments as well as cargo liabilities among
all the involved stakeholders.  However, these
don’t provide any support for agreed upon
security requirements to be adopted.  At the
same time, it is not possible to verify that
physical carriers follow what is stated in the
contract.  Finally, governments also have a
significant role in the enhancement of security in
physical distribution (Actor VIII).  Many believe
that regulations may stimulate operators;
however there is still confusion and uncertainty
about the costs and related requirements of the
authority certifications.  Thus many companies
are waiting.
Implications, Future Research and
Limitations
This manuscript reveals practical implications
for managers as well as the necessity to conduct
further research. The practical implication of this
investigation is to use the framework in  Figure
3 to stimulate stakeholders to identify initiatives
that could bring mutual benefits and higher
security to all the actors identified in the PDSS.
The main recommendation is to accomplish this
objective by promoting collaboration
opportunities that may introduce new driving
forces, remove the existing barriers or perhaps
turn the barriers into driving forces.
Future research should be oriented to performing
more descriptive studies based on empirical data
to confirm the hypotheses found in this paper.  Is
it true, as previous investigations point out, that
insecurity in supply chains is merely caused by
such factors as globalization and JIT?   Or may
other inter-organizational relationships
complicate the implementation of security
measures as well as discourage distribution
operators?  In terms of limitations, the main data
used for the analysis is collected by means of
qualitative techniques and is based on a
restricted number of interviews.  Therefore
subjectivity of interpretations as well as limited
generalizability of the findings is acknowledged.
Once the factors explaining the vulnerability of
supply chains to antagonistic attacks have been
clearly identified, normative research should be
performed to understand how the stakeholders’
goals may be aligned and, thereby, supply chain
security improved. Enhancing security within a
supply chain requires the involvement of
multiple stakeholders that need to agree on a
specific degree of protection and thereby specify
security requirements in supply or transportation
contracts.  This process today presents many
difficulties for practitioners, and the research
challenges concern the development of standard
agreements in which security requirements are
specified, achievement of consensus, sharing of
responsibilities, internalization of security costs
as well as risk and cost sharing among
stakeholders.  Another important aspect is the
standardization and harmonization of security
across supply chains.  As many authors state, “a
supply chain is as secure as the weakest of its
links.”  Therefore it is essential that stakeholders
speak the same security language and strive to
align the protection level of all the nodes and
links of a supply chain network.  Especially from
a technological viewpoint, a standardization
process of security technologies has to be
initiated.
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